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There	is	no	opportunity	to	avoid	opportunity	costs:
facing	the	second	wave
As	a	second	wave	of	COVID-19	hits	Britain,	some	argue	that	a	further	lockdown	is	necessary.	Adam	Oliver	(LSE)
warns	that	while	people	have	a	tendency	to	focus	on	the	worst-case	scenario,	many	people	in	liberal	democracies
will	not	accept	restrictions	on	the	way	in	which	they	live	their	lives	indefinitely.
Several	years	ago,	when	reflecting	on	the	UK	government’s	response	to	the	2009	swine	flu	(N1H1)	pandemic,	I
wrote:
“…	pandemics	are	quite	rare,	but	unfortunately,	this	means	that	it	is	not	possible	to	estimate	accurately
the	chance	that	the	severe	threat	will	occur.	This	is	partly	why	the	government	responded	as	if	the
severe	threat	would	materialise.	However,	if	an	informed	guess,	on	the	basis	of	past	experience,	can	be
made	on	the	chance	of	the	severe	threat	being	realised	–	say,	25%	–	then	the	government	would	need
to	respond	four	times	to	reap	the	benefits	of	tackling	a	severe	threat	once.	Therefore,	the	cost	side
would	have	to	be	multiplied	by	four,	and	even	then	this	would	not	account	for	the	broader	unintended
consequences	associated	with	fear,	desensitisation	etc.	It	is	of	course	possible	that	a	‘worst	case’
response	to	every	pandemic	does	indeed	represent	a	good	use	of	resources,	and	it	may	in	any	case	be
the	type	of	response	that	most	policy	makers	and	the	general	public	want	to	see,	but	both	of	these
considerations	require	more	analysis	and	public	discourse.	A	more	sobering	thought,	however,	is	that
even	the	most	aggressive	response	might	well	be	ineffective	against	the	inevitable	catastrophic
pandemics	that	lie	ahead”	(Oliver,	2013,	pp.29-30).
When	COVID-19	started	to	hit	the	headlines	at	the	beginning	of	2020,	there	were	those	in	the	behavioural	science
community	who	suggested	that	human	psychological	processes,	such	as	the	overweighting	of	small	probabilities,
loss	(exacerbated	by	fear)	aversion,	cascade	effects	etc.,	meant	that	when	the	threat	of	a	pandemic	or	other
possible	catastrophic	event	emerges,	people	tend	to	focus	on	the	worst	case	scenario.	In	evolutionary	terms,	this
may,	in	a	sense,	be	rational	–	it	may	feed	the	survival	instinct.	But	in	modern	societies,	where	governments	are
charged	with	protecting	societal	values	and	interests	and	spending	public	monies	wisely,	a	measured	response
from	those	that	lead	that	suppresses	the	urge	to	panic	might	typically	be	more	sensible.
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Subsequently,	of	course,	this	pandemic,	and	the	responses	to	it,	for	various	reasons	have	proven	to	be
catastrophic,	and	the	behavioural	scientists	who	suggested	that	the	early	fear	might	prove	unwarranted	have	been
ridiculed;	but	those	behavioural	scientists	were	right.	People	do	have	a	tendency	to	focus	on	the	worst-case
scenario	in	these	circumstances,	and	the	worst-case	scenario	will	not	usually	ultimately	happen.	Thus,	if	a
government	always	responds	as	though	the	worst	will	happen,	then,	as	I	tried	to	explain	in	my	reflection	on	the
swine	flu	pandemic,	most	of	the	time	that	government	will	waste	an	awful	lot	of	resources.	However,	some	of	the
time,	the	worst	case	will	occur,	fully	justifying	the	government’s	response.	As	a	society,	therefore,	we	ought	to	try	to
deliberate	on	whether	the	resources	wasted/disruption	to	the	economy/distortion	of	priorities	etc.	from	an
aggressive	response	to	the	more	usual	case	–	where	the	worst	does	not	happen	–	are	outbalanced	by	the
appropriateness	of	such	a	response	in	the	less	likely	event	of	a	fully	realised	threat.
Many	of	those	who	predicted	very	early	in	2020	that	the	current	pandemic	would	cause	great	harms	are	now
labelled	as	modern	day	Nostradamuses,	but	in	reality	they	just	got	lucky	(if	we	can	use	that	term	in	this	context).	If
previous	pandemics	are	an	appropriate	guide,	then	most	of	the	time,	their	predictions	would	have	been	wrong.
However,	as	a	pandemic	progresses,	more	evidence	is	of	course	collected,	which	makes	predictions	less	uncertain
and	government’s	more	accountable	for	their	actions.	For	instance,	the	UK	government	continued	to	spend	an
enormous	amount	of	public	money,	and	consequently	distorted	priorities	inappropriately,	even	after	it	was	known
that	the	2009	swine	flu	outbreak	did	not	pose	an	extreme	threat.	Perhaps	partly	as	a	consequence,	the	government
delayed	excessively	their	response	to	the	current	pandemic	in	the	face	of	strong	and	mounting	evidence	that	this
strain	of	coronavirus	was	going	to	cause	serious	harms.
The	second	wave	of	the	pandemic	that	has	hit	us	this	autumn	has	brought	with	it	a	second	wave	of	almost	total
uncertainty.	We	do	not	yet	know	whether	the	rate	of	infection	will	continue	at	an	increasing	rate,	and	even	if	it	does,
whether	the	death	rate	will	follow	suit.	Yet	many	are	fearing	the	worst	–	and,	indeed,	the	government’s	chief
scientific	officers,	perhaps	stung	by	criticism	that	they	under-reacted	earlier	in	the	pandemic,	have	been	keen	to
highlight	a	worse	case	scenario.	Perhaps	they	themselves	are	fearing	that	an	insufficient	number	of	people	are	now
in	fact	willing	to	believe	that	the	worse	will	happen,	and	are	thus	trying	to	incentivise	those	people	to	sustain	or	alter
their	behavioural	patterns	to	ensure	that	it	does	not.
How	stringent	should	measures	therefore	be	to	contain	the	second	wave?	A	move	towards	full	lockdown	would	be
catastrophic	for	people’s	livelihoods	and	general	way	of	life,	and	perhaps	unnecessarily	so,	if	a	significant	rise	in	the
death	rate	would	not	in	any	case	occur.	Yet	a	failure	to	act	might	well	lead	to	many	of	us	losing	our	loved	ones
earlier	than	we	might	this	winter,	or	lead	to	our	loved	ones	losing	us.	People	are	more	likely	to	sustain	behaviours
such	as	handwashing,	mask	wearing	and	social	distancing,	and	tolerate	harder	measures	such	as	full	lockdowns	so
long	as	they	believe	the	situation	to	be	bad,	but	many	of	these	measures	(except	perhaps	handwashing)	do	come
with	genuine,	varied	and	potentially	profound	costs,	and	thus,	as	I	mentioned	earlier,	the	likely	harms	averted	from
these	measures	have	to	be	balanced	against	these	costs.	The	worst-case	scenario	is	not	likely	to	occur,	but	even	if
it	does	the	deaths	that	may	have	been	avoided	are	sadly	not	the	only	costs	that	count.
Despite	all	these	uncertainties,	it	does	seem	clear	to	me	that	people	in	liberal	democracies	will	not	accept
restrictions	on	the	way	in	which	they	live	their	lives	indefinitely	–	not	only	because	it	is	bad	for	their	own	financial,
physical	and	mental	health,	or	the	consequent	damage	it	does	to	public	services,	but	because	it	undermines
perhaps	the	most	important	thing	of	all:	their	freedom.
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This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	COVID-19	blog,	nor	LSE.
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